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NOTES AND COMMENT
The court held that such resolution was not an encumbrance within the
terms of the instrument.
It is a general rule that where there is a restriction imposed by law,
a covenant restricting something that is already prohibited does not con-
stitute an encumbrance between the vendor and purchaser, because it
binds the owner no further than he could be bound by law in the
absence of a covenant,' 2 but where the restriction is greater than that
imposed by law, even though it does not prejudically affect the market
value of the premises, it has been held to be an encumorance." 3
WILLARD A. BOWMAN
Animals Owner not liable for injuries by animal in absence of
neglect or previous notice of vicious propensities.-
My Oberon! What visions have I seen!
Methought, I was enamoured of an ass.
(Midsummer-Night's Dream, Act 4, Sc. i.)
Although by lde-bound tenets of philosophy man has been postu-
lated to be "a rational animal," by a judicial construction in the state of
Wisconsin and elsewhere the former opinion is being overruled by a
slow but sure growth ad mnajorem equi gloriam. There is grave danger
that the horse will be judically noticed as the rational animal and man as
the irrational. The apotheosis of Pegasus is upon us.
In support of the premises the writer cites you Kocha v. Union
Transfer Co.,' in which it was held that the defendant was not liable
where the plaintiff, a bicyclist, had been thrown to the pavement by
reason of his bicycle having been kicked by defendant's horse (described
as of a high-strung, nervous temperament), there being no allegation
that the horse had any vicious propensities or that the defendant had
knowledge of them. Though ostensibly an exoneration of the Union
Transfer Co., the case is a glorification of the high-bred and tactful
horse-the real defendant. The learned court (which never, never
sinks to levity) proceeds
It being, therefore, -a verity in this case, that the horse possessed that which,
according to Iago, if in man or woman, "is the immediate jewel of their souls,"
"a good name," it must suffice for the horse and for us, that determining whether,
in addition to good character and reputation, he also possessed a rare discriminat-
ing taste and intelligence of head or heels when, in his pick for his kick, he chose
the insensate bicycle rather than the sensating rider, as it is claimed for him by
appealing counsel by saying, he very carefully kicked the bicycle, not the man, and
the bicycle in the very center of the handlebars, there leaving his mark, no claim
being made that he could write.
Not as an alarmist but as one sincerely interested in preserving the
status quo ante of man in the court* the writer begs to point out that
unless this defection from truth and justice be curbed in limme we will
have every J. P in the land holding court in a stall. The acceptable
reply to counsel's leading questions will be "neigh, neigh, sir." The
court bible will be hoof-marked and dog-eared instead of thumbed.
' Clsment v. Burtis, 121 N.Y. 708, 24 N.E. io3; Floyd v. Clark, 7 Abb. N.C.
136, 39 Cyc. 1500.
"Bidl v. Burton, 177 App. Div. 824, 164 N.Y.S. 824.
1 205 N. W 973 (Wis.)
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Counsel will no longer be permitted to ride the witness. Instead of
determining the prosecuting witness' age at the time of the alleged as-
sault by producing the birth-record, the family bible, and the testimony
of the fond mother (who, up to the present has been conclusively
presumed to have been present at the birth) we will have the expert
veterinarian called in to look at her teeth. Personal injuries will be
described as spring-halt, charley-horse, spavin and the blind-staggers
(though it is to be noted that the latter has always been peculiar to
every two-legged High Priest of Bacchus who righteously observes
the Feast of the Hangover) The salacious hee-haw of the irrepressi-
ble vulgus in the rear of the court room will be music in hizoner's
gyrating ears. If counsel expects to rate high they will have to ex-
pectorate Horse-Shoe Cut Plug.
Deposutt lex de sedes et exultavit equum
Of course the eulogy of the horse in the Kocha case, supra, is
rationalized by the court. The law is in his favor. The common law
rule regarding scienter has been changed only as against the runt tribe
of gutter-pups. Whereas, in the good old days before Section 1620,
Stat. of 1911, "every dog was entitled to one bite," the said section
wiped out with one fell swoop of the legislative pen the freedom and
liberty of dogdom-it was a veritable canine Eighteenth Amendment,
carrying with it no prospect of "light bites and growls." "But," says
the court, "there has been no modification as to the horse or a taking
from him of his free first kick." Here we have the sad spectacle of
the court's smiling benignly on the horse's kicking when it is matter of
common knowledge that his master's kicking in the same court would
be l~se inajest6.
But if this were not sufficient to show to what heights the ambitious
horse is climbing in our courts witness Lyman v Dale,2 in which case
Mr. Justice Lamm sings a pin to the Missouri mule. It is true that
the mule is the baser brother of the horse but the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution should guarantee to him the equal
protection of the laws. What's good for the horse should be good for
the mule. Although the Federal Supreme Court has not as vet con-
strued the Amendment to go farther than wiping out the old civil
distinction between white man and black it is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that the late progress of the horse will soon force a test case upon
the court to determine the .respective civil rights of the mule and the
horse. It is to be hoped that the dubious generation of the mule will
not blind the court to the parus delictus of many fewer legged asses
that enjoy the franchise. Be that as it may, Justice Lamm was over-
indulgent to the led mule in Lvnan v Dale, supra, that kicked five
dollars worth of spokes out of Mr. Lyman's buggy wheel. The learned
Justice says, "It must be allowed as a sound psychological proposition
that haltering his head or neck can in no wise control the mule's thoughts
or control his hinder parts affected by those thoughts. So much is due
to be said of the Missouri mule whose bones, in attestation of his activity
and worth, lie bleaching from Shiloh to Spion Kop, from San Juan
to Przemysl. But the faithfulness, the endurance, the strength,
i 156 Mo. App. 427, 136 S.W 760,
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and the good sense of the mule (all matters of common knowledge)
may be allowed to stand over against his faults and create either an
equilibrium or a preponderance in the scales in his favor." Leading
the "defendant" mule by a five-foot halter was held not to be negligence
per se, even though experts testified that such animals (this mule's
little girl friend was also among those present at the time of the alleged
tort but was not joined as a party defendant) should have been "neck-
ing." Although the learned Justice understood "necking" to mean
halter-yoked he left nothing to the wagging of idle tongues and de-
nounced this practice of "necking" as shameful in law and morals.
What mule would not feel a glow of pardonable pride on hearing this?
-a vain mule would forever after part his hair in the middle. Stronger
language could not have been used against his human brother upon a
charge of "Driving While Infatuated."
But enough has been said to show that the ass is not without some
rights in the courts even on sentimental grounds.
In Baumgartner v. Hodgdon,3 which was an assault and battery ac-
tion, the provocatory remark was directed at the defendant's horse.
The words of the plaintiff were either that the defendant had "a thing
of a horse," or that the defendant's horse was the "damndest-looking
horse he ever saw" The court said
Both may be conceded to have been slanderous and defamatory of the
horse but the most that can be said is that it was disgraceful to the
horse, but the horse was not present. Moreover, we have the right to assume
that the animal was endowed by nature with the usual amount of "horse-sense,"
and that, had the remark been overheard by him, ne would have dismissed it
without reply as the opinion of one not competent to speak on the subject.
Q.E.D. The horse stands rectus in curia.
But lest our more cautious brethren at the bar still doubt we append
the final panegyrie in Kocha v. Union Transfer Co., supra.
What was said, sung, and held in that decision concerning the Missouri mule,
with all the storied, latent possibilities lurking in his heels, will surely support
and warrant the conclusion here reached as to this Wisconsin horse. It is true
that neither his pedigree, place or date of birth appear of record here, but it is
disclosed that he had lived with us and worn out his shoes upon our pavements
these many years; this, in view of the verity of his unimpeached character, supra,
warrants, if not requires, the presumption in a Wisconsin court that he was
Wisconsin bred as well as led. Then, of course, being a Wisconsin horse, he, like
Webster's Massachusetts, "needs no encomium." 3. P T.
Equity Zoning ordinance as implied covenant in deeds.-Where,
at the time of a sale, there exists a restrictive zoning ordinance affect-
ing the property, which subsequent to the sale of the land, is repealed,
does such restriction become impliedly a part of the covenant and bind-
ing between both the parties and stangers? The main question hinges
upon whether or not it can be enforced as an implied covefiinff As
an example, suppose that -A sells to B. At the time of the sale there is
a zoning ordinance, the effect of which is to create a thirty foot build-
ing line. After the land has gone through-several hands, and the ordi-
nance having been repealed, the last purchaser proceeds to build in a
3o5 Minn. 22, 116 N.W io3.
